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DENIAL OF RETROACTIVE STATE
WELFARE PAYMENTS BY FEDERAL COURT
Federal courts in numerous cases1 have considered the question of
ordering state welfare departments to make retroactive payments to
welfare recipients from whom assistance monies were wrongfully
withheld. In Rothstein v. Wyman,2 State welfare recipients brought
a class action to enjoin the enforcement of a New York statute'
authorizing a geographic differential in AFDC and AABD4 payments
between New York City and a seven-county area surrounding it. The
Second Circuit affirmed the district court'ss finding that the differen-
1. Notable cases awarding retroactive benefits include: Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969); Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1043 (1971); McDonald v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 430 F.2d 1268 (5th
Cir. 1970); Alexander v. Weaver, 345 F. Supp. 666 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Saddler v.
Winstead, 332 F. Supp. 130 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Doe v. Hursh, 337 F. Supp. 614
(D. Minn. 1970); Boddie v. Wyman, 323 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D.N.Y. 1970);
Alvarado v. Schmidt, 317 F. Supp. 1027 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Baxter v. Birkins,
311 F. Supp. 222 (D. Colo. 1970); Brooks v. Yeatman, 311 F. Supp. 364 (M.D.
Tenn. 1970); Machado v. Hackney, 299 F. Supp. 644 (W.D. Tex. 1969);
Alvarez v. Hackney, Civil No. 68-18 SA, (W.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 1969); Cooley v.
Juras, Civil No. 67-662 (D. Ore., June 27, 1969).
Cases denying retroactive benefits include: Bryant v. Carleson, 444 F.2d 353
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 967 (1971); Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp.
1173 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Rodriquez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ill. 1970);
Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12 (D. Me. 1970); Robinson v. Hackney, 307
F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
2. 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1552, rehearing denied,
93 S. Ct. 2276 (1973).
3. N.Y. Soc. Szav. LAw § 131-a (McKinney 1969).
4. Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Aid to the Aged, Blind and
Disabled.
5. 336 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The case was first tried before a three-
judge district court, which granted a preliminary injunction, 303 F. Supp. 339
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, saying that stat-
utory grounds in the complaint should be decided before constitutional grounds,
398 U.S. 275 (1970). The three-judge district court then remanded to a single-
judge district court, which found that the differential violated the Social Secur-
ity Act and regulations issued under it, 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (1) and 1382 (a) (1)
(1935). The court enjoined defendants from further enforcement of the statute
and ordered them to remit to all aid recipients in the seven-county area the
difference between what the recipients had been paid under the statute and what
they would have been paid under a schedule equivalent to New York City's.
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tial violated the Social Security Act and that injunctive relief was
proper, but held that the district court's award of retroactive benefits
was an improper exercise of equity jurisdiction. The circuit court's
basis for denial of retroactive benefits was that an order of such pay-
ments would jeopardize the sensitive federal-state relationship that
characterizes the welfare program.6 The court said that since states are
dependent on federal matching grants to operate their welfare pro-
grams and these grants are not made unless the states comply with
federal requirements, the states are poorer partners whose pride
should not quickly be stepped on by a federal court.7
There is no stated congressional or Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare position on the question of court-ordered retro-
active payments for welfare recipients,8 and the issue received vir-
tually no judicial attention until the late 1960's. 'When the issue did
surface, it became embroiled in a welter of jurisdictional problems.a
Furthermore, the cases that have decided the issue suffer from a lack
of detailed explanation of their conclusions. 10 The majority of the
cases have ruled in favor of granting retroactive benefits, usually on
the uninformative ground that plaintiffs were entitled to the monies
wrongfully withheld.1' These decisions apparently relied on the
6. The court also stated that even if an order of retroactive payments would
be a proper exercise of equity jurisdiction, this was actually a federal court suit
against the state and would be barred by the eleventh amendment. The court
based this statement on the fact that the retroactive payments would come not
from the pockets of state welfare officials but from the public funds of the state.
467 F.2d at 236.
7. Id. at 232.
8. HEW's fair hearing requirement does provide for retroactive payments, but
only after an administrative decision. U.S. DEP'T OF H.E.W., HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC AssIsTANCE ADMINISTRATION, Part IV, § 6200(k). The HEW Hand-
book also provides that the federal government will match state corrective retro-
active payments, including those "made in accordance with a court order." Id.
§ 6500.
9. See, e.g., Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12 (D. Me. 1970), which held
that since the purpose of a suit against state welfare administrators in their
official capacities is to win a judgment payable out of a state's public monies, it
is in reality a suit against the state and therefore a federal court does not have
jurisdiction. Two reasons were given by the court: (1) a state is not a "person"
subject to a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (2) the eleventh
amendment prohibits federal court suits against states.
For a discussion of these problems see Levy, The Aftermath of Victory, 3
CLeARINOHous Rv. 253, 258, 330, 331, 350 (1970).
10. Levy, supra note 9, at 258.
11. See note 1 supra.
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general rule, "that judicial precedents in cases of this nature normally
have retroactive as well as prospective effect." 12
The court in Rothstein began by discussing the decision in Rosado
v. Wyman" s and then dealt with what it described as the congressional
policy behind welfare legislation. The court reached the conclusion
that retroactive benefits were not dictated by Rosado or by legisla-
tive policy. Retroactive benefits should therefore not be granted, the
court reasoned, since to do so would strain the federal-state relation-
ship in the welfare program.1 4
In Rosado, with virtually the same factual situation as Rothstein'r
the district court refused to utilize its equity powers to order retro-
active payments.- The court grounded its refusal on the fact that
the Supreme Court had stated in remanding that the district court
should review any revised program submitted by the State or issue
an order restraining the further use of federal funds if no revised
program was submitted.'7
The district court in Rosado concluded from this statement that
retroactive payments were not warranted since: "[Gjoncern over the
strong implications for federalism . . . undoubtedly motivated the
Supreme Court to emphasize that the State was to be given a
choice."' 8 It seems more likely that the Supreme Court in Rosado
did not even consider, when remanding, that plaintiffs might sub-
sequently seek retroactive payments. This was admitted by the circuit
court in Rothstein, which said that the decision in Rosado was based
on that court's conception "of what constitutes an appropriate exer-
tion of the extraordinary powers of equity in the federal-state welfare
context." 9
The circuit court in Rothstein did not, therefore, rely on any rea-
soned analysis that might have been presented in Rosado. It merely
12. McDonald v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 430 F.2d 1268, 1269 (5th Cir.
1970).
13. 322 F. Supp. 1173 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
14. 467 F.2d at 235.
15. Rosado was a challenge by AFDC recipients to the same New York statute
involved in Rothstein. One of the claims was also identical to that in Rothstein:
that differentials in payments violated the Social Security Act.
16. Plaintiffs had not asked for retroactive payments until the case reached
the district court on remand.
17. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 421-22 (1970).
18. 322 F. Supp. at 1195-96.
19. 467 F.2d at 233.
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cited Rosado as a proper exercise of equity jurisdiction. In comparing
the equities of the two cases, however, the court in Rothstein did not
deal with the fact, noted in the district court's opinion,20 that the
financial cost to the State of making retroactive payments was far less
than it would have been in Rosado.2 1
The Second Circuit's examination of the federal policy embodied
in welfare legislation focused on what the court said are the three
congressional goals retroactive payments can conceivably help achieve:
preventing intentional state violations of federal requirements, meet-
ing the ascertained needs of the poor, and guaranteeing the proper
use of federally granted moniesY2-
The court dismissed the first goal as not applicable by pointing to
the absence of bad faith by defendant state officials.2 3 It thereby
rejected the decision in Alvarado v. Schmidt,24 which held that to
deny retroactive payments in this situation would permit the state
to "violate . . . federal statutory requirements with financial impu-
nity." 5 The district court in Rothstein had found that to refuse
retroactive benefits would "sanction the defendants' lawless con-
duct."26 The circuit court, in reversing, ignored the possibility that
retroactive benefits could serve as a warning to the state legislature,
as well as the welfare department, that it should scrupulously examine
the operation of the state welfare program.
In regard to the question of satisfying the needs of the poor with
retroactive payments, the Fifth Circuit held in McDonald v. Depart-
ment of Public Velfarezl that a decision invalidating a state's dura-
tional residency requirement was retroactive, and that plaintiff was
entitled to payment of monies illegally withheld even if the state's
welfare program was based on a "current subsistence grant" and
plaintiff had subsisted without it.
An even stronger position was taken by an Illinois district court
in Alexander v. Weaver,28 which was decided shortly before Rothstein.
20. 336 F. Supp. at 334.
21. It is not clear from the opinion in Rosado how high a cost was involved.
22. 467 F.2d at 235.
23. Id.
24. 317 F. Supp. 1027 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
25. Id. at 1042.
26. Civil No. 69-2763 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 25, 1972).
27. 430 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1970).
28. 345 F. Supp. 666 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
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The court in Alexander held that a decision invalidating an Illinois
statute and regulation denying AFDC benefits to needy children
between the ages of 18 and 21 who were attending college would
be given retroactive application. The court stated that the right to
proper aid payments vested at the time of the need, and "cannot
now be divested by the argument that we must look at the individ-
uals financial situation today or whether the purpose would be ac-
complished today."29 The situation, the court said, is like that of a
state employee whose salary was wrongfully withheld, in which case
the back pay would be granted without question. 30 Finally, the court
asserted that the equivalent of a constructive trust was placed on the
state regarding these funds, to be released when eligibility was
proven.m 3
Rothstein went against these decisions, the court saying that since
the needs of the poor change over time, the delay in payment of
welfare funds results in the payments being compensatory rather
than remedial.3 2 The court may have misapprehended the nature of
retroactive benefits. It has been said that they serve as restitution, not
as compensation or remedy.33 When seen in this perspective, retro-
active benefits may be said to fulfill the federal interest in meeting
the needs of the poor.
The interest of the federal government in the proper use of its
granted funds was also minimized, on the ground that Congress has
never suggested that retroactive payments are necessary to protect
its interest.3 4 The court treated the fact that HEW regulations re-
quire retroactive payments upon an administrative decision favoring
the recipient as not relevant to the question of court-ordered pay-
ments.35 No reason was given by the court as to why retroactive pay-
ments should be granted in one instance but not in the other. It
has been argued that: "[Tjhe result should not be different merely
because he [claimant] chooses to pursue his remedies in a court rather
29. Id. at 673.
30. Id. at 675.
31. Id.
32. 467 F.2d at 235.
33. Levy, supra note 9, at 351.
34. 467 F.2d at 235.
35. Id. at 242 n.11.
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than in an administrative hearing." 36 At least one court has followed
this reasoning37
Rothstein's method of dealing with the issue of court-ordered retro-
active welfare payments, that is, examining congressional policy,
differed from that employed in Alexander. The latter case posited
three specific criteria for granting retroactive payments.3s The facts
in Rothstein dearly met the first two: "whether the right to relief
had 'vested,'" and "whether the class is a cohesive and concrete
one." The final criterion was "the various situations in other wel-
fare cases where retroactive relief was granted."40 It is not dear,
however, what logical relationship exists between the particular
nature of the wrong discovered and the granting or denying of retro-
active benefits. The vital issue is whether there has been a wrongful
withholding of monies from plaintiffs. If it is found that there has
been a wrongful withholding, no reason has been shown, other than
cost to the state, why retroactive benefits should be denied to plain-
tiffs who received less aid than welfare recipients in the next county,
but granted, for example, to plaintiffs whose claims for assistance
were not passed upon within thirty days after their filing.41
The court in Rothstein, after discussing federal welfare policy
goals, reached what it described as "the realities of the situation"-
the expenditure of state funds-and decided that retroactive benefits
were not warranted. 4- The court cited the scheme of federalism em-
bodied in the welfare program, in which states were to be free to
determine how to spend their money, and concluded that the tensions
that might result from a federal court ordering the state to expend
its funds against its will are not justified, absent a congressional
mandate to do so.43 Several other courts have cited financial cost to
the state as grounds for denying retroactive payments in welfare class
36. Levy, supra note 9, at 258.
37. Schirripa v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Serv., No. 129-160 (Wis.
Cir. Ct., March 19, 1971). See also Machado v. Hackney, 299 F. Supp. 644, 647
n.4 (W.D. Tex. 1969).
38. 345 F. Supp. at 677.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1043 (1971).




actions, 44 although other than Rosado, none emphasized the scheme
of federalism involved.45
The issue might be more realistically framed in terms of dollars
and cents than principles of federalism. The cases denying retroactive
benefits in class actions apparently involved potential state expendi-
tures in the millions of dollars.4 s In Robinson v. Hackney,47 the
district court frankly stated that its denial of retroactive benefits
was based on the great cost the state would have to bear if the pay-
ments were granted.48 The cases lead to the conclusion that the ques-
tion to be answered is not whether retroactive payments are justified,
but at what financial cost to the state do they cease to be justifiable.
Rothstein seems to reject this conclusion, holding that it is not
within the equity jurisdiction of a federal court to order a state to
make retroactive welfare payments. Rothstein will probably be more
realistically interpreted, however, as merely lowering, behind a screen
of federalism, the amount of retroactive welfare payments that federal
courts will impose on the states.
Stephen G. Pressman
44. See, e.g., Bryant v. Carleson, 444 F.2d 353 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 967 (1971); Robinson v. Hackney, 307 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
45. 322 F. Supp. at 1195-96.
46. The $1.7 million estimate in Rothstein is miniscule compared, for example,
with the approximately $90 million in payments the court in Bryant refused to
order, as well as the payments avoided in Rosado.
It is difficult to determine precisely how the estimate in Rothstein compares
with other cases because most courts have not stated the costs involved.
47. 307 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
48. Id.
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